Real Solutions: End Notes
i. Final EIS quote on traffic (pages 1251-2 of Appendix A, Final EIS,
http://www.honolulutransit.com/media/50915/20110701-final-eis-appendix-a.pdf
The complete quote is, “You are correct in pointing out that traffic congestion will be worse in the future with rail than what it is today without rail, and that is supported by data included in the Final EIS. In fact, projections suggest that traffic conditions will be worse in 2030 under any circumstances [studied in the EIS]. The Alternatives Analysis supports this statement as does the analysis of transportation impacts in the Final EIS. The key comparison to the Project is that rail will improve conditions compared to what they would be if the Project is not built.”
And here is what FTA’s Regional Administrator wrote, “Many commenters [on the Draft EIS] reiterated their concern that the Project will not relieve highway congestion in Honolulu. FTA agrees, but the purpose of the Project is to provide an alternative to the use of congested highways for many travelers. This alternative to the use of highways is especially important for households that cannot afford an automobile for every person in the household who travels for work or for other reasons.”
Even worse is the fact that when you read the rationale for building rail in the Final EIS, you find that they never had any intention of reducing traffic congestion below today’s unbearable levels. Read it here: http://www.honolulutransit.com/media/7512/20110701-final-eis-chapter-01.pdf Page 1-21.
Bear in mind that “rapid transit” is officially classified by FTA as “heavy rail.” And when they used the word “mobility” they mean “mobility by public transportation.”
ii. From Table 3-12 (http://www.honolulutransit.com/media/7518/20110701-final-eis-chapter-03.pdf) below we can make the comparisons between the increases in “Automobile – private” from “2007 existing conditions ” to the “No Build Alternative” (that is, doing nothing much) and the “2030 Project (rail).” That is 1,291,800 to 2,815,800 (do nothing) or 2,767,600 (rail). That works out to 22.8 percent and 20.8 percent respectively, or round up the numbers, 23 and 21 percent.
iii. http://www.staradvertiser.com/editorialspremium/20120527_What_exactly__is_Cayetanos_transit_plan__.html?id=154328575
iv. The two studies referred to are the State of Hawai‘i’s IMG Report and the FTA’s PMOC October 2011 Report on risks and uncertainties.
The IMG Report was commissioned by Governor Lingle because of her concerns that fallout from potential shortcomings of the rail project might impact state finances. The Washington DC firm is highly respected in analyzing public finances.
The Report calculated a cost overrun in rail construction (and other areas) using the Downside Case of $1.7 billion plus the base of $5.2 billion = $6.9 billion. They said, “The Downside Case is a downside scenario where assumptions are toward the pessimistic end of the likely range, but still are very reasonable. The C&C should be prepared to provide the levels of support to the Project required in the Downside Case.” P.38. http://www.voteben2012.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Final_IMG_Report.pdf
The FTA’s Project Management Oversight Contractor estimated a 10 percent risk of the rail project construction exceeding $7.4 billion. http://www.voteben2012.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/PMOC_OCT2011.pdf. Table 69 and associated text.
v. The 2010 Final EIS for rail states, “Some existing bus routes, including peak period express buses, will be altered or eliminated to reduce duplication of services provided by the fixed guideway system.” http://www.honolulutransit.com/media/7515/20110701-final-eis-chapter-02.pdf page 2-43.
vi. Details of the Regional Plan start on page 2-26 of Chapter 2 (25 megabytes) of the 2003 BRT plan available here: http://www.voteben2012.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Pages_101-174_2003_FEIS_BRT_Vol_1.pdf
For the full 205 megabyte Final EIS Vol. 1 for the BRT download from here: http://www.voteben2012.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/2003_FEIS_BRT_Vol_1.pdf . These are large files so a little patience is needed.
vii. Higher daily ridership for BRT for 2025 for BRT Table 4.2-1 FEIS 312,570 (see link above), for Rail in 2030 riders are 282,500 in Table 3-12 of the 2010 Final EIS (http://www.honolulutransit.com/media/7518/20110701-final-eis-chapter-03.pdf, page 3-29). BRT is forecast to be 10.6 percent higher than rail.
viii. Table 6.1-1 in the FEIS for the 2003 BRT shows $1.04 billion (see link above), but this can be significantly reduced by eliminating the embedded plate technology (EPT) costing $129 million.
ix. The original In-Town BRT plan was using two dedicated two lanes in the centers of Ala Moana and Kapi‘olani Boulevards. Not surprisingly, this segment of BRT was heavily criticized and opposed. I agree with the critics and we will review the feasibility of using dedicated lanes on King and Beretania streets instead.
This engineering drawing above is from the HART website (http://www.honolulutransit.com/media/11457/20090414-historic-effects-report-appendix-b.pdf, page 29/31) and is described as a typical cross section showing the rail lines along Kona Street between Pensacola and Piikoi Streets.
The elevated rail line on the right of the drawing depicts the provision of a secondary rail line, which is one of the “planned extensions” to UH and Waikiki to go over the structures along Kona Street that are part of Ala Moana Center. Note that it is a single line which raises questions about the frequency of service to UH and Waikiki when there is only a single line to service both of them. Also note the approximately 3½-foot high sound barriers on the outer edges of the rail line. These are to reduce the sound level of the train.
Imagine going over H-1 to UH Mānoa and the station in the Quarry.
Imagine the train going down Kalākaua and Kuhio Avenues.
And even worse imagine having to raise the additional $4 billion dollars to pay for the extensions.
The 11-mile H-1 zipper lane currently only runs into town in the morning rush hour but at this time enables express buses to travel unimpeded for its full length. The PM zipper lane is planned to run in the opposite direction during the afternoon rush hour.
xii. The new CEO of HART gave the City Council a figure slightly in excess of $9 billion to complete the “planned extensions.” These would connect East Kapolei to Kapolei Town and connect Ala Moana Center to UH Mānoa and Waikīkī. http://www.hawaiireporter.com/honolulu-city-council-approves-450-million-in-commercial-paper-to-strengthen-rails-financial-plan/123
xiii. The quote below from the 2003 Final EIS for the Bus/Rapid Transit program clearly show that the thousands of O’ahu residents that Parsons Brinckerhoff and the City interviewed did not want a heavy rail (rapid transit) line because it was unacceptably expensive, too intrusive on the visual environment, and divisive of communities. This Final EIS for BRT was signed off by the City and the FTA.
“The concerns that led to the rejection of the most recently proposed elevated rapid transit system were primarily two: (1) its high cost and (2) its physical and visual impacts … Public input received in hundreds of Vision Team and O’ahu Trans 2K meetings and workshops attended by thousands of O’ahu residents revealed widespread agreement that while an elevated transit system might serve goals of improving in-town mobility and strengthening connections between communities, such a system would not foster livable communities. The predominant sentiment among thousands of participants was that a grade-separated transit system would be unacceptably: (1) intrusive on the visual environment; (2) divisive of communities; and (3) too expensive. These shortcomings were judged by public participants to outweigh the recognized benefits of a grade-separated system, i.e. high speed and capacity, increased reliability and reduced negative impact on the surface road system.”
Source: Final EIS for the BRT Project, FTA and City, July 2003. p. 2-57.
